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Research Article 






The techniques of probabilistic population forecasting are increasingly being recognised 
as a profitable means of overcoming many of the limitations of conventional 
deterministic variant population forecasts. This paper applies these techniques to 
present the first comprehensive set of probabilistic population forecasts for Australia. 
We stress the disadvantages of directly inputting net migration into the cohort 
component model in probabilistic forecasting, and propose a gross migration flows 
model which distinguishes between permanent and non-permanent immigration and 
emigration. Our forecasts suggest that there is a two thirds probability of Australia’s 
population being between 23.0 and 25.8 million by 2026 and between 24.4 and 31.8 
million by 2051. Comparisons with the latest official population projections of the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics are made. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the devotion by demographers of much time and effort to population 
forecasting, the track record in these efforts – except for very short-term forecasts – is 
mixed. The changes in fertility, mortality and migration over time are not understood 
sufficiently well for quantitative models to be built in order to provide accurate 
forecasts of the age-specific rates which need to be input into cohort-component 
forecasting models. Many population projections have been rather wide of the mark in 
the medium and long term, particularly in the components of change (births, deaths, and 
migration) and age disaggregated projected populations (see, for example, Keilman 
2001). In fact the one statement that can be made with a very high degree of certainty 
about a deterministic population forecast is that it will turn out to be wrong (even if 
only by a small amount). 
The traditional way of handling the uncertainty of population forecasts is to 
produce variants, typically high, low and medium population variants, themselves 
constructed from combinations of high, low and medium future paths of fertility, 
mortality and migration. It is increasingly recognised that this approach contains a 
number of problems, such as the lack of probabilities attached to the variants (Lutz and 
Scherbov 1998), the smooth trajectories of demographic variables which implicitly 
assign zero probability to sudden changes, annual fluctuations and cyclical behaviour 
(Lee 1999), and the fact that the variants are probabilistically inconsistent both between 
variables and over time (de Beer and Alders 1999). Over the last 15 years or so 
demographers have overcome these problems by preparing probabilistic population 
forecasts. In these forecasts a range of future population figures are presented for each 
year of the forecast horizon along with a probability of the population falling within that 
range. So far probabilistic population forecasts have been prepared for a number of 
countries, including Austria (Lutz and Scherbov 1998), Finland (Alho 2002), the 
Netherlands (de Beer and Alders 1999), Norway (Keilman et al. 2001), Sweden (Cohen 
1986), the United States (Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994) and for world regions (Lutz et al. 
2001, Lutz et al. 2003a). Probabilistic population forecasts have, in fact, also been 
produced for Australia. The US National Research Council (2000) used past United 
Nations projection errors to calculate 95% confidence intervals for total population that 
can be applied to deterministic forecasts. More recently, Booth (2004) prepared 
probabilistic forecasts for Australia, but unfortunately included an assumption of no 
migration. The need remains, therefore, for a full set of probabilistic population 
forecasts for Australia. 
We believe this paper makes two main contributions. First, we present the first 
comprehensive set of probabilistic population forecasts for Australia. A particular 
feature of our forecasts is an age breakdown by single years of age 0-119 with a final Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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open-ended age group of 120+ to deal with the coming expansion of the centenarian 
population. Second, and more importantly, our model disaggregates international 
migration into four streams – permanent and non-permanent immigration and 
emigration – in order to reflect the quite different levels, trends and age-sex profiles of 
these migration flows. A simple, but effective, method which mimics the strong 
correlation between non-permanent immigration and emigration is described. This four-
stream disaggregation contrasts with the more common approach of modelling 
immigration and emigration or just net migration. 
Following this introduction the paper describes the models, data and assumptions 
prepared in order to produce the forecasts reported here, dealing in turn with the jump-
off populations, fertility, mortality and international migration. Section 3 then presents 
the forecast outputs to illustrate the uncertainties in Australia’s demographic future, 
focusing on the total population, the demographic components of change and age 
structure. Comparisons are made with the latest population projections prepared by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 
 
 
2. Methods, data and assumptions 
As with most probabilistic population forecasts the standard cohort component model is 
taken as the starting point. The probabilistic element is incorporated by running the 
model several thousand times with randomly varying age-specific rates and flows. The 
resulting forecast population figures are then sorted year by year to give an estimated 
forecast distribution of future population. The literature suggests three principal 
methods for producing these distributions of fertility, mortality and migration: (i) 
model-based approaches, (ii) expert judgement and arguments, and (iii) an analysis 
based on past forecast errors. For descriptions of the approaches see Keilman et al. 
(2001) and de Beer and Alders (1999). In practice, most producers of probabilistic 
population forecasts no longer use any one approach exclusively, instead drawing 
strength from two or three of them. In our forecasts we relied on time series models 
adjusted by judgements and arguments, together with some input from analyses of past 
ABS forecast errors. 
Our approach to forecasting may be summarised in six steps. 
Step 1. Seven summary indicators of the demographic components of change were 
chosen: the TFR, male and female life expectancy at birth, permanent immigration, 
permanent emigration, long-term immigration and long-term emigration. Long-term 
migration is defined as non-permanent migration involving a minimum residence period 
of one year. The reasons for selecting these four migration streams are given in   
section 2.4. Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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Step 2. Time series models of all the summary indicators were estimated. Some 
were adjusted on the basis of judgement and past forecast errors. Details are given in 
sections 2.2 to 2.4. 
Step 3. The medians of the predictive distributions for the seven summary 
indicators were formulated, ceiling and floor limits to the predictive distributions set in 
some cases, and other parameters chosen. Details of these assumptions are also covered 
in sections 2.2 to 2.4. 
Step 4. For each of the indicators 5,000 random sample paths covering the forecast 
horizon 2002-51 were generated. If during any simulation a summary indicator 
exceeded specified ceiling and floor limits for any year that simulation for the whole 
forecast horizon was rejected and another sample path was generated. This continued 
until 5,000 sample paths which fell within the limits created for each summary 
indicator. An example of the sort of random sample paths generated by this process is 
given in Figure 1, which shows two paths for permanent immigration. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Estimated permanent immigration and two of the 5,000 sample paths 
 
Source of estimates: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Note: random jump-off points were used to deal with the uncertainty over 1997-2002 data, shown as the dashed line. 
 
Step 5. Using a cohort component model, 5,000 simulations of Australia’s 
population over the period 2002-51 were computed. The seven sets of summary 
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5,000 sample paths for each summary indicator in the first run, the second of the sample 
paths in the second run, and so on). Age-specific rates (for fertility, mortality and 
emigration) and age-specific proportions (for immigration) were generated during 
program execution by applying fixed age schedules to the summary indicators. For 
fertility and both types of immigration this process was very simple: age-specific 
fertility rates scaled to sum to 1.0 were multiplied by the TFR, and immigration 
proportions which summed to 1.0 across all age-sex groups were applied to the total 
immigration figures. For mortality an iterative procedure was used to link the value of 
e0 to a corresponding set of age-specific death rates. Permanent and long-term 
emigration forecasts were calculated by scaling the base year emigration rates so that 
when multiplied by the populations at risk in each age-sex group the resulting 
emigration numbers summed to the forecast total emigration figure.  
Step 6. The results of the probabilistic forecasts were output in ‘raw’ format, with 
the populations, births, deaths and migration components from each simulation written 
to file as they were generated. A separate program was used to sort and summarise 
selected features of these data. The sorting is needed to calculate selected forecast 
intervals. For example, a 95% predictive interval for total population for a specified 
year is found by calculating total populations for each year from the raw database, 
sorting them into size order, and selecting the values at 2.5% and 97.5% of the way 
through the 5,000 simulations (i.e. the 125th and 4,876th values). This approach enables 
us to return to the raw the data and extract summary information very quickly for any 
selected output variable. 
We now turn to the models, data and assumptions used to generate the various 
model inputs, starting with the jump-off populations, and then describing in turn how 




2.1 Jump-off populations 
The ABS makes available mid-year population estimates by sex and single years of age 
0-99 and 100+. For these forecasts we extended the mid-2002 jump-off populations by 
single years of age to the highest attained age using the extinct generations and 
constrained survivor ratio methods described by Thatcher et al. (2002). It was found 
that the official population estimates in the 90s were inflated somewhat so our own 
figures were used for ages 90 and above, and the official figures for ages 89 and below. 
To allow for a rise in the highest attained age in the future the forecasting model was 
programmed to deal with single years of age up to 119 with 120+ as the final age group. Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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2.2 Fertility 
The TFR was found to be well represented by an ARIMA(1,1,0) process: 
 
  (T) c     (T) ε   2)]  TFR(T - 1) [TFR(T     1) TFR(T     TFR(T) TFR TFR TFR + + − − + − = φ         (1) 
 
where T denotes a one year forecast interval,  TFR φ  is the autoregressive coefficient, 
TFR ε  are random errors sampled from a normal distribution with a mean of zero, and 
TFR c  is the constant. The  TFR φ  and  TFR ε  values are listed in Table 1 and the predictive 
TFR distribution is shown in Figure 2. 
The constant terms consist of small adjustments to gradually shift the median of 
the predictive distribution from its base year value of 1.736 to our long-run assumption 
of 1.70. This assumption is based on the belief that the pronatalist policy which was 
introduced by the Australian Government on 1st July 2004 will probably prevent much 
further decline in fertility. This policy entitles mothers to claim a $3000 maternity 
payment for each child born, a figure which will rise to $5000 by 2008 (Atkins, 2004). 
A similar, but means-tested, policy has been adopted by the Labor opposition 
(Australian Labor Party, 2004). 
Whilst the initial fit of the ARIMA model was to TFR data over the period from 
1921 (the earliest available) we decided to use the error distribution from the model 
fitted to just 1976-2002, the period of below-replacement fertility in Australia. Using 
the error distribution from the whole 1921-2002 period not only implies that the social 
and economic context of childbearing of earlier decades is still relevant today but also 
gives a 95% confidence interval for mid-century that extends from -0.4 to 3.8. Clearly, 
negative TFR values are nonsense and can be prevented by rejecting sample paths with 
negative values, but the upper limit of 3.8 was also judged too extreme. In 
contemporary Australian society there is high female participation in higher education 
and the labour force, much higher wages for women in real terms (and therefore higher 
opportunity costs of childrearing), considerable control over fertility through modern 
contraception methods and a changed societal attitude in which childlessness is quite 
acceptable (McDonald 2003). It seems most unlikely, therefore, that the fertility levels 
of the 1950s and 60s will return. Even those industrialised countries which have seen 
rises in fertility in recent times (such as Denmark) or varying trends (such as Sweden) 
have not, over the last three decades, experienced fertility at anything like that of the 
Australian baby boom. Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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Table 1:  Parameter values (standard errors in parentheses) 
Fertility 
TFR φ  = 0.504 (0.097)     standard deviation of  TFR ε  = 0.039 
TFR c  = -0.036 from 2009-10, and trended from 0 up to that date 
 
Mortality 
standard deviation of 
0 e ε = 0.316 for males and 0.323 for females 
0 e c  = slowly declining from 0.261 in 2002-03 to 0.160 in 2050-51 for males;  
slowly declining from 0.224 to 0.158 for females 
 
Permanent immigration 
PI φ  = 0.777 (0.092)     standard deviation of  PI ε  = 19,214 
PI c  = 26,760     standard deviation of jump-off error = 28,540 
 
Permanent emigration 
PE φ  = 0.522 (0.135)     standard deviation of  PE ε  = 3,037 
PE c  = 0      standard deviation of jump-off error = 9,809 
 
Long-term immigration 
LTI 1, φ  = 0.320 (0.155)      LTI 2, φ  = -0.070 (0.166)      LTI 3, φ  = 0.405 (0.161) 
standard deviation of  LTI ε  = 5,673 
LTI c  = 3,000      standard deviation of jump-off error = 60,000 
 
Long-term net migration 
LTN φ  = 0.914 (0.074)     standard deviation of  LTN ε  = 7,187 
LTN c  = 1,291      standard deviation of jump-off error = 30,000 
 
Note: standard errors are not reported for constant values as all such fitted values were adjusted in some way (as described in 
sections 2.2 to 2.4) Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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Figure 2:  Estimated total fertility rates and prediction interval bounds 
 
Source of estimates: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
 
An analysis of past ABS TFR forecast errors supports our view of the original 
predictive distribution being too wide. Figure 3 shows the errors for all variants of ABS 
projections. The standard deviations of the ABS errors are 0.19 after 5 years, 0.29 after 
10 years and 0.28 after 15 years, or if the 1970 forecast is excluded, 0.13, 0.18 and 0.18 
respectively. In our original predictive distribution the standard deviation of TFR errors 
was 0.32 after 5 years, 0.44 after 10 and 0.54 after 15 years. Even in our modified 
predictive distribution the standard deviation after 5 years is 0.14, 0.23 after 10 and 0.29 
after 15 years, which is still erring on the side of caution in relation to past errors. 
The only additional constraints placed on the TFR forecasts were a floor limit of 
zero and a ceiling limit of 3.40. Even with the use of the smaller error distribution a 
handful (about 10) sample paths still contained negative values. The ceiling limit was 
introduced at the same distance from the long-run assumption as the floor as a simple 
way of preventing the median and mean of the distribution of sample paths rising 
upwards away from the long-run assumption. Again, only about 10 sample paths 
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Figure 3:  Past ABS TFR forecast errors 
 
Source:   calculated from Australian Bureau of Statistics TFR estimates and population projections for jump-off years 1970, 1976, 




To model mortality we calculated annual e0 figures from deaths and populations by sex 
and single years of age from 1971 to 2002, 1971 being the first year for which 
population estimates based on the usually resident definition are available. Whilst 1971-
2002 would normally be viewed as a rather short time series for forecasting purposes, 
there are good reasons for not going back much further than 1971. Although the ABS 
has estimated e0 back to the late nineteenth century these data are averages over three 
and ten year periods and therefore do not capture the year to year variability needed for 
modelling. There are a number of other data problems up to the 1960s (see note 1). 
More importantly, the discontinuity in Australian mortality trends in the late 1960s / 
early 1970s and fairly steady change since then (AIHW 2000) suggests that the period 
since this discontinuity is the most sensible to use for forecasting. We note that other 
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Figure 4:  Past ABS forecast errors for male e0 
 
Source:   calculated from Australian Bureau of Statistics death counts and population estimates, and population projections for 
jump-off years 1970, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999. 
 
Carter mortality forecasts for Australia Booth et al. (2002) found that the optimal fitting 
period for their model was from 1968 onwards. 
In applying the Box-Jenkins model identification procedure it was found for 
female e0 that both a differenced moving average model, ARIMA(0,1,1), and a 
differenced autoregressive model, ARIMA(1,1,0), gave almost equally good fits. 
For male e0 an ARIMA(0,1,1) proved unsatisfactory as it had a moving average 
coefficient of almost 1.0, though an ARIMA(1,1,0) fitted well. However, forecasts with 
the differenced autoregressive models gave 95% predictive intervals which after 10 
years were 2.5 years for males and 2.6 years for females; after 50 years these had 
expanded to only 5.4 years for males and 5.5 years for females. We felt that these 
intervals were uncomfortably narrow, particularly when compared to past ABS errors in 
forecasting e0. Figure 4 shows errors in forecasting male e0 from several ABS 
projections.  
We therefore decided to fit a simple random walk with drift model for male and 
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2051 we obtained 95% ranges of 8.7 years for males and 8.8 years for females. The 
model may be described as: 
 
  T) (s, c     T) (s, ε   1) T (s, e     T) (s, e
0 0 e e 0 0 + + − =                  (2) 
 
where s denotes sex, 
0 e ε  is randomly drawn from a normal distribution of error values 
with a mean of zero and 
0 e c  is a constant. Parameter values are given in Table 1. Given 
that the factors which affect mortality are likely to influence both male and female life 
expectancy at birth similarly, it is not surprising to find that the 
0 e ε  values are highly 
correlated (r = 0.914). In forecasting the sample paths, therefore, correlated random 
numbers for male and female e0 errors were produced. These were obtained via a 
Cholesky decomposition of the variance- covariance matrix (Press et al. 2001: 89-91). 
No ceiling and floor constraints were applied to the e0 sample paths.  
Rather than use the constant values obtained from the model fitting procedure we 
decided to adjust them so that the medians of the predictive distributions matched those 
of separate e0 forecasts based on extrapolated age-specific death rates. We took this 
approach because the literature on the future of mortality, whilst voluminous, 
unfortunately provides little guidance to forecasters on the long-run prospects for 
mortality, and because Australian age-specific deaths rates exhibit roughly constant 
exponential decline over the period 1971-2002. The forecasts were calculated as 
follows. Taking age-and sex-specific death rates calculated for the 1971-2002 period, 
we computed three year average death rates for 1971-73 and 2000-2002. These 
schedules were extended to age 120 by fitting and extrapolating the Kannisto version of 
the logistic model (Thatcher et al. 1998). The mortality age schedules were then 
smoothed and the annual average exponential rates of decline were calculated. The age 
patterns of these rates of decline were themselves smoothed and a small adjustment was 
made for males in the late 20s and early 30s to change a small annual increase in death 
rates to a small decrease. This reflects our optimistic view that the rise in young adult 
male mortality from self-harm and accidents will reverse. Using these smoothed annual 
average decreases we extrapolated out to 2051, finding 2050-51 e0 values of 87.7 years 
for males and 92.1 years for females. Figure 5 shows the predictive distributions for 
male and female e0. Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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Figure 5:  Estimated life expectancy at birth and prediction interval bounds 
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2.4 International migration 
For international migration we were initially faced by the decision of which method of 
incorporating migration into the cohort-component model to use. Should net migration 
be modelled, or immigration and emigration separately? If so, should immigration and 
emigration be disaggregated by population category, such as permanent and long-term? 
And are rates or numbers better? (McDonald and Kippen 2002). 
The use of net migration numbers in the cohort-component calculations is 
appealing because of low data requirements (past net international migration trends can 
be computed as the residual of population change minus natural change) and the need to 
consider immigration-emigration correlations is also avoided. However, there are a 
number of conceptual and practical limitations to this approach. 
(i) From a conceptual standpoint there is no such thing as a net migrant (Rogers 1990). 
While models by definition incorporate only the main elements of a system, it is argued 
that just modelling net migration is too great a simplification of real world processes. In 
the same way that it would be unsatisfactory to model natural change directly rather 
than as the result of separate fertility and mortality processes, migration is best 
modelled by reference to both immigration and emigration. 
(ii) The use of net numbers of migrants in a cohort component model can potentially 
generate nonsensical negative populations for some age groups. In forecasts for 
Australia this problem will be rare because net migration age profiles contain positive 
net migration figures or small negative figures. In other countries, however, where 
some probabilistic net migration sample paths are highly negative for the entire forecast 
horizon then this issue is likely to arise. 
(iii) The use of fixed age schedules of net migration presents at least two substantial 
problems in probabilistic forecasting. First, it prevents international migration from 
responding to the population’s evolving age profile. As a population ages one would 
expect the net migration age profile to respond to the changing age composition of the 
population. Second, it fails to incorporate the wide variations in the net migration age 
profile that result from different levels of immigration and emigration. This is less of an 
issue in deterministic forecasts in which total net migration is often held constant over 
time, but in a probabilistic forecast in which there are substantial variations in 
immigration and emigration a fixed age schedule of net migration cannot be justified. 
To illustrate this, Figure 6 shows the predictive distribution of the age profile of net 
migration for the final year of our forecasts. 
In the light of these concerns, an obvious alternative would be to model 
immigration and emigration separately. In fact, Australian migration statistics allow us 
to do better than this, as they distinguish between permanent and long-term migration. 
These data are sourced from arrival and departure cards completed by all arriving and Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
 http://www.demographic-research.org  208 
departing passengers at airports and ports. Classification into permanent and long-term 
categories is based on self reported status of intended stay and visa category. Permanent 
immigrants are identified as arrivals who hold migrant visas, regardless of stated period 
of intended stay. Permanent emigrants consist of permanent residents who on departure 
state that they intend to settle permanently in another country. Long-term arrivals 
comprise Australian residents returning after a year or more overseas, together with 
overseas visitors stating they intend to spend a year or more in Australia. Long-term 
departures comprise Australian residents leaving the country for a year or more (but not 
permanently) and overseas visitors who have been in Australia for a year or more, now 
departing. New Zealand citizens receive special treatment in the migration statistics. 
They are free to live and work in Australia without being required to obtain permanent 
residence status, and will be classified as either as permanent or long-term migrants 
depending on what they state on their arrival or departure cards. 
 
 
Figure 6:  Predictive interval bounds of the net migration age profile, 2050-51 
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The permanent/long-term distinction permits the different characteristics and 
changing relative importance of the two migration types to be taken into account. Long-
term migration has increased substantially since the 1980s, driven in large part by 
international student migration and the flows of skilled transients (Hugo 1999). At the 
same time permanent immigration has fluctuated around a linear trend. These two types 
of migration are also characterised by quite different age-sex profiles, with long-term 
migration being more concentrated in the young adult ages and permanent migration 
consisting of relatively more migrants in the childhood and older adult age groups (see 
Figure 11). So to more accurately reflect the contemporary structure of Australia’s 
international migration system we chose to model four separate flows:  
(i) permanent immigration,  
(ii) permanent emigration,  
(iii) long-term immigration, and  
(iv) long-term emigration.  
The question of whether migration rates or flows should be used is one that is 
rarely considered (though see Rees 1989, McDonald and Kippen 2002, Withers 2002). 
For immigration (both permanent and long-term), rates are problematic. Which 
population at risk should be used – the rest of the world or just the population of those 
countries which supply most of Australia’s migrants? Yet forecasting immigration as a 
function of other countries’ population sizes is difficult to justify given that 
international migration is influenced so much by factors such as migration policies, 
major world events, economic conditions and family ties. It could be argued that 
Australia’s population should be used as the population “at risk” because of its role as a 
crude indicator of employment opportunities and family reunion migration. This type of 
“rate”, however has the danger of forecasting ever increasing numbers of immigrants – 
a danger which is particularly relevant to probabilistic modelling in which some sample 
paths of rates would be very high. In addition, for permanent immigration, past data do 
not show it rising in line with population, and the government’s Migration Program is 
formulated in terms of numbers. We have therefore used numbers for both permanent 
and long-term immigration. 
For permanent emigration, the use of rates rather than numbers seems sensible as it 
relates the amount of emigration to the size of the population at each age and ensures 
that the number of emigrants does not exceed the available population. However, past 
data on permanent emigration from Australia fail to show a clear relationship with 
population size (Figure 7) so we opted for the simpler option of forecasting total 
permanent emigration numbers. This also gives net permanent migration forecasts 
which fit well with past trends. In forecasting age-specific emigration, however, we 
initially applied base year age-specific rates to the population and then scaled the initial 
emigration numbers to match to specified total. This approach allowed emigration to be Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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influenced by the changing shape of the population age profile and thus lowered the risk 
of emigrating out more people in any particular age group than there were available. 
Long-term emigration was also modelled in terms of numbers because of the way in 
which it was modelled via net long-term migration and long-term immigration 
(described below). 
In modelling the sample paths for the four migration streams an attempt was made 
to reflect the nature of each migration flow and the correlations between them. All 
migration models were fitted to data from 1959 (the first year for which permanent and 
long-term migration are identified separately) to 2002. An ARIMA(1,1,0) model was 
found to fit permanent emigration well: 
 
  (T) c     (T) ε     2)] PE(T - 1) [PE(T     1) PE(T     PE(T) PE PE PE + + − − φ + − =        (3) 
 
where ‘PE’ denotes ‘permanent emigration’ and the other terms are defined as 
before. The  PE φ  and  PE ε  values are listed in Table 1. Permanent immigration, 
however, was found to be represented best by a simple ARIMA(1,0,0) model: 
 
  (T) c     (T) ε     1) PI(T       PI(T) PI PI PI + + − φ =                (4) 
 
where ‘PI’ denotes ‘permanent immigration’ and the other terms are defined as before. 
Parameter values are given in Table 1. In addition to providing a good fit to past data an 
autoregressive model without differencing also suits permanent immigration from a 
conceptual viewpoint. Whilst this model can generate large fluctuations from the 
median the predictive intervals cease widening after just a few years, reflecting the 
strong pull of the median of the distribution, or rather, the strong influence of Australian 
government migration policies on this migration stream. Permanent immigration 
consists of migrants granted visas through the Migration and the Humanitarian 
Programs arriving in Australia, as well as New Zealand citizens migrating permanently. 
For most categories of visa in the Migration Program, and for the Humanitarian 
Program, there are limits to the numbers of visas issued each year. Despite this 
influence from government policy, there are quite substantial year to year fluctuations 
in the permanent immigration figures. This is partly due to fluctuations in the size of the 
immigration program, but it also reflects delays between visa issue and date of arrival 
as well as visa-free Trans-Tasman movement. Past trends suggest, at best, weak links 
between permanent immigration and permanent emigration so they were assumed to be 
independent in the modelling. 
Long-term immigration and emigration trends, however, are strongly correlated. 
This is to be expected given that these flows consist of foreign students and skilled Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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workers migrating temporarily to Australia for study or employment, and flows of 
Australian citizens and permanent residents going overseas for a few years. In 
constructing a model for these two flows we kept in mind that the future of long-term 
migration is quite uncertain. It is not yet clear whether the recent rise in long-term 
migration is a shift to a new level, or whether it represents the beginning of a long-run 
increase (Hugo 1999). This uncertainty suggested wide predictive distributions, but 
with a fairly close correspondence between long-term immigration and emigration, thus 
giving a net long-term migration predictive distribution that is considerably narrower. A 
three-stage process was used to achieve this.  
 
(1) First, long-term immigration was modelled. We found that an ARIMA(3,1,0) model 
was appropriate in this case: 
 
  (T) c     (T) ε   4)] LTI(T - 3) [LTI(T    
3)] LTI(T - 2) [LTI(T    
  2)] LTI(T - 1) [LTI(T     1) LTI(T     LTI(T)
LTI LTI LTI 3,
LTI 2,
LTI 1,
+ + − − φ +
− − φ +
− − φ + − =
               
                       (5) 
 
where ‘LTI’ is for ‘long-term immigration’ and the other terms are defined as before. 
Parameter values are shown in Table 1.  
 
(2) Second, long-term net migration was modelled as an ARIMA(1,0,0) process: 
 
  (T) c     (T) ε     1) LTN(T       LTN(T) LTN LTN LTN + + − φ =            (6) 
 
where ‘LTN’ denotes ‘long-term net migration’. Again, parameter values are given in 
Table 1. Because of the correlation between the error values for long-term immigration 
and net long-term migration (r = 0.714) correlated random errors were generated via 
Cholesky decomposition. A small number of sample paths (about 100) were rejected 
and replaced because they contained long-term immigration and net migration values 
which implied negative long-term emigration.  
 
(3) Finally, long-term emigration was calculated simply as long-term immigration 
minus long-term net migration. We emphasise that long-term net migration was 
modelled only as part of the process of generating long-term emigration. It was not 
input into the cohort component model. 
Although the international migration models described above are non-trivial, 
probably the greatest challenge in implementing the migration component of the Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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probabilistic forecasts was the assumption setting. International migration statistics for 
Australia, particularly in recent years, are thought to have become quite unreliable 
(Khoo and McDonald 2000, McDonald et al. 2003, ABS 2003b). In fact, when 
supplying the authors with international migration data the ABS strongly advised 
against drawing any conclusions from the data for 1997 onwards. In all graphs, 
therefore, 1997-2002 data are shown with dashed lines to represent this health warning. 
The problems with the data stem from the incorrect categorisation of migrants, and 
double counting. The most puzzling phenomenon of recent years is a huge increase in 
long-term immigration without the expected increase in long-term emigration. 
McDonald et al. (2003) suggest that this discrepancy is due to a number of factors. 
First, there are long-term immigrants who convert to permanent residence whilst in 
Australia (these migrants should then be re-classified in the international migration 
statistics to permanent immigrants, though this does not currently occur). Second, there 
is a tendency for some people who state on arrival in Australia that they intend to stay 
for exactly one year (and are therefore long-term immigrants) to leave just short of one 
year (so should really be classified as short-term visitors). Third, some double counting 
occurs. For example, foreign students and workers who return home for a short visit to 
their home country part-way through their studies or employment contract will leave 
Australia classified as a short-term visitor (ABS 2003b). When they return a week or 
two later they may have more one year still to complete in their studies/employment 
and will indicate this on their arrival passenger card, and therefore be counted as a long-
term immigrant (again). In response to these difficulties the ABS recently instituted a 
new method of estimating international migration flows which deals with many of these 
problems (ABS 2003b). However, these newly-estimated figures are only available 
from mid-2001 onwards so the assumptions required for these forecasts must make use 
of the old, less reliable data. Furthermore, the new method does not solve all of the 




(a) Permanent immigration 
 
 
(b) Permanent emigration 
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(c) Net permanent migration 
 
Figure 7:  (Cont.) Estimated permanent migration and prediction interval bounds 
 
Source of estimates: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Notes:   (1) As discussed in the text, the permanent immigration estimates are thought to be too low due to the exclusion of 
long-term migrants who convert to permanent residence whilst in Australia (who should then be re-classified as 
permanent immigrants). 
  (2) Dashed lines for 1997-2001 denote data thought to be particularly unreliable, as advised by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. 
 
We now turn to the migration forecast assumptions. For permanent immigration 
we set the median trend at 120,000 per year for the course of the projections. This 
consists of a government Migration Program of 105,000 per year, a Humanitarian 
program of 10,000 per year and a long-run annual average gain of 5,000 New 
Zealanders. Ceiling and floor limits of ± 120,000 were applied to the permanent 
immigration error forecasts. For permanent emigration we chose a median figure of 
35,000 per year, with ceiling and floor limits ± 35,000. Because of the uncertainty of 
recent migration statistics, probabilistic jump-off year values were selected. The widths 
of these jump-off error distributions for permanent immigration and emigration were 
estimated by running the model without any jump-off errors for 2002-2007, equivalent 
to starting the migration simulations in 1997. This makes the bold assumption, of 
course, that the migration figures were accurate until 1997. The predictive distributions 
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We assumed that long-term migration would continue to grow in importance so we 
set the long-term immigration trend to grow by 3,000 per year. This is an arbitrary 
figure but reflects an expectation that in an increasingly inter-connected world long-
term migration will increase in intensity. A net gain of 15,000 per year was set, 
indicating an expansion of the temporary resident population. Given the great 
uncertainty about the direction of long-term immigration and emigration we allowed 
wide predictive distributions for these two migration streams. Ceiling and floor limits 
for long-term immigration were set at zero and twice the set trend, whilst for net long-
term migration sample paths that implied negative long-term emigration when 
combined with the long-term immigration figures were rejected. For estimating the 
jump-off year uncertainty the approach used for permanent migration produced a jump-
off distribution for long-term immigration where the recently observed suspect figures 
lay well above the upper 95% limit. This seemed unsatisfactory so we used 
guesstimates instead. Relevant parameters are given in Table 1. The predictive 
distributions for long-term migration are shown in Figure 8 and the combined 
permanent and long-term predictive distributions are shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
(a) Long-term immigration 
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(b) Long-term emigration 
 
(c) Net long-term migration 
 
Figure 8:  (Cont.) Estimated long-term migration and prediction interval bounds 
Source of estimates: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Notes:  (1) As discussed in the text, the long-term immigration estimates are thought to be too high due to the inclusion of 
short-term visitors (who, because they are in Australia for less than one year, should not be classified as migrants) and 
long-term migrants who convert to permanent residence whilst in Australia (who should then be re-classified as 
permanent immigrants). 
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(a) Permanent and long-term immigration 
 
 
(b) Permanent and long-term emigration 
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(c) Net permanent and long-term migration 
 
Figure 9:  (Cont.) Estimated permanent and long-term migration and prediction 
interval bounds 
 
Source of estimates: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Note: Dashed lines for 1997-2001 denote data thought to be particularly unreliable, as advised by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
 
Before the parameters of the migration models were finalised a comparison with 
past ABS net international migration forecast errors was made (comparisons of 
immigration and emigration errors were not possible as the ABS projection model uses 
net migration only). These errors are shown in Figure 10. The net international 
migration predictive distribution (Figure 9c) has a standard deviation of about 53,000 
from just three years into the forecast horizon, after which it remains about constant. 
The standard deviation of the past errors three years into the forecasts is 44,000 and 
between 40-50,000 thereafter. This suggests that our predictive distribution is a fraction 
too wide but in light of the recent migration data reliability problems we decided not to 
make any adjustments. 
The international migration age profiles were provided by parameterised model 
migration schedules (Rogers et al. 1978), and these are shown in Figure 11. Because of 
the ABS’ health warning about the quality of recent migration data we decided to base 






































































































Figure 10:  Past ABS net international migration forecast errors 
 
Source: calculated from Australian Bureau of Statistics population projections for jump-off years 1970, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987, 
1989, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999 and net migration figures calculated by the residual method using population estimates, births 
and deaths. 
Note: jump-off year errors (forecast period of zero) are not shown because not all ABS projection volumes reported the relevant net 




















































(a) Male immigration 
 
Figure 11:  Parameterised model migration schedules for male and female 
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(d) Female emigration 
 
Figure 11:  (Cont.) Parameterised model migration schedules for male and female 
permanent and long-term immigration and emigration 
 
Note: above age 100 international migration was assumed to be zero. Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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3. Results 
3.1 Total populations 
Figure 12 presents the forecast distribution for the total population of Australia for 
2002-2051. The median population forecast for 2051 is 28.0 million, with the two thirds 
probability range covering 24.4 to 31.8 million, an interval equal to 26% of the median 
forecast. The 95% probability range in 2051 extends from 21.1 to 36.0 million.  
If Australia’s population follows the median of the forecast distribution this will 
represent a 42% increase in population over the 2002-51 period, a sizeable proportion 
of which will be due to population momentum. As shown in Figure 16(a) the age 
structure of Australia’s population does not suffer from the undercut profile 
characteristic of low-fertility countries, which, with a TFR of 1.70 and when 
supplemented by immigration, should ensure a plentiful supply of future parents and 
births. To isolate the contribution of Australia’s age structure to future population 
growth we prepared a forecast with replacement fertility (a TFR of 2.075), life 
expectancy held constant, and no migration. This gave a 2051 population of 22.2 
million, demonstrating that of the 8.3 million increase in the country’s population from 
2002-51 according to the median forecast, 31% will be the result of positive 
momentum. This situation is in stark contrast to many low fertility countries and the 
European Union as a whole where momentum has become negative (Lutz and Scherbov 
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Figure 12:  Estimated total populations and prediction interval bounds 
 
Source of estimates: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Note: The slight discontinuity observed in 1971 is due to the change in the population definition from census counts of persons 
present to usually resident population estimates. Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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We now turn to see how our forecasts compare with (i) the application of the 
National Research Council’s (2000) ex post method to our median forecast, and (ii) the 
official population projections for Australia prepared by ABS. The National Research 
Council’s ex post method suggests that the 95% predictive interval for Australia 50 
years after the jump-off year spans 0.7040 to 1.4205 of the point forecast (calculated 
from National Research Council 2000: Table F-3). Taking the median 2051 forecast of 
28.0 million as the point forecast (and ignoring the fact this is only 49 years out) we 
obtain a 95% range of 19.7 to 39.8 million. 
The ABS prepared a large number of variants in its 2002-based set of projections 
(ABS 2003a), though most prominence is given to three variants – labelled Series A 
(high), Series B (medium) and Series C (low). Although it is pointed out that “these 
projections are not intended as predictions or forecasts” (ABS 2003a: 1) most users, 
understandably, consider the medium variant as the most likely population future. This 
variant puts Australia’s population at 24.0 million by 2026 and 26.4 million in 2051, a 
little lower than the 24.4 and 28.0 million medians of the total population forecast 
distribution for 2026 and 2051 that we forecast. The difference is due to both higher 
fertility and higher life expectancy at birth in our forecasts. 
In presenting their projection results the ABS “uses Series A and C to show a 
range, although not the full range, of the projected populations” (ABS 2003a: 31). 
Where does this high-low range lie on the total population predictive distribution as 
presented in Figure 12? This is a difficult question to answer because it varies year by 
year. In 2011 the range is from 21.1 million (series C) to 21.9 million (series A) which 
covers 63% of our predictive interval for this year. Moving on to 2026, the range 
extends from 22.8 million (series C) to 25.7 million (series A), encompassing 69% of 
possible outcomes according to our forecasts. By 2051, it has expanded to between 23.0 
million (series C) and 31.4 million (series A), covering 73% of our predictive 
distribution. The inconsistency of the deterministic variants approach to uncertainty is 
thus clearly demonstrated. 
 
 
3.2 Components of population change 
Future total populations are of course influenced by the future paths of the demographic 
components of change. The international migration predictive distributions which 
formed part of the forecast inputs have already been discussed; here the forecast 
distributions for births, deaths and natural change are examined. Predictive distributions 
for births and deaths are shown in Figures 13 and 14.  
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Figure 13:  Recorded births and prediction interval bounds 
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Figure 14:  Recorded deaths and prediction interval bounds 
 
Source of estimates: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
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Figure 15:  Natural increase and prediction interval bounds 
 
Source of estimates: calculated from Australian Bureau of Statistics data 
 
Australia’s future with respect to births looks bright, with relatively little change 
from the numbers of births recorded in recent years according to the median of the 
distribution. McDonald and Kippen (1999: 4) make the useful point that large variations 
in Australia’s age structure “can mean that demand for public services such as 
education and health services also fluctuate. As these services can involve substantial 
infrastructure and training costs … it is more efficient to try to avoid widely fluctuating 
age structures”. If the trend in births roughly follows the median of the predictive 
distribution then this desirable outcome will be achieved. Of course, it may not. The 
graph plainly shows that there is very considerable uncertainty surrounding the number 
of births, more than might be expected from looking at trends over the last 50 years, and 
this uncertainty continues to increase significantly over the forecast horizon. Why is 
this? The answer is that uncertainty is cumulative over the generations: from about 20 
years into the forecasts some births are being produced by mothers not born in 2002, so 
there is increasing uncertainty in both the TFR and the size of the childbearing age 
population from about this time. 
The future numbers of deaths are much more certain. This is partly due to the 
narrower forecast distributions for e0, and partly because most deaths over the forecast 
horizon occur to people already alive. The uncertainty of immigration and emigration, 
which is concentrated in the young adult ages (Figure 11), starts to contribute to the Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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uncertainty over deaths when the cohorts which passed through the peak migration ages 
early in the forecast period reach the elderly ages in mid-century.  
The net effect of births and deaths, natural increase, is displayed in Figure 15. This 
reveals that in the near future the surplus of births over deaths is likely to dip below 
100,000 for the first time in over 50 years. With the coming rise in the number of deaths 
the contribution of natural increase to population change looks set to decline 
substantially, though by mid-century it is still likely to be positive. Whilst this huge 
decline in natural increase may alarm some commentators, it should be noted that in 
many other industrialised countries natural increase by this time will be highly negative; 
indeed in a few countries the switch from positive to negative natural increase has 
already taken place (United Nations 2003). 
 
 
3.3. Age-sex structures 
Figure 16 illustrates how uncertainty in Australia’s age-sex structure unfolds over the 
forecast horizon. In the first few years of the forecasts the relatively high uncertainty 
surrounding the numbers of births results into fairly wide predictive intervals in the 
youngest childhood age groups whilst the uncertainty over international migration 
manifests itself mostly in the peak migration age groups of the younger adult ages 
(Figure 16b). By 2021 (Figure 16c) these cohorts have spread this migration uncertainty 
to higher ages, whilst the two decades of uncertainty over births can be seen clearly in 
the fan shape at the bottom of the pyramid. The lower uncertainty over mortality takes 
longer to become evident in the age-sex structure, though by 2031 (Figure 16d) it has 
started to become apparent in the elderly ages. Beyond this time the pattern of 
uncertainty across age groups changes little but continues to widen (Figure 16e and f). 
Notice how the predictive distribution at the childhood ages by mid-century mirrors that 
of births (Figure 13). 
We now briefly focus on three broad age groups: 0-19, 20-64 and 65+. Figure 17 
shows the predictive distributions for these age groups expressed as both numbers and 
percentages of the total population. Reflecting the median of the predictive distribution 
for births, Figure 17a reveals that the approximately stable number of 0-19 year olds 
which has existed for the last three decades is most likely to continue. Figure 17b shows 
that as a percentage of the population, however, there is a little chance of this age group 
maintaining or increasing its share of the population total. Relative to the population in 
the working ages, as expressed by the Youth Dependency Ratio (Table 2), the 
dependency of children is most likely to decline. 
Rather more certainty surrounds the future size of the working-age group 
population. Figure 17c suggests that this population group is most likely to continue Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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growing throughout the forecast horizon, albeit it at a reduced rate. Interestingly, 
although the share of this age group in the population declines, it is unlikely to be much 
lower than it was in the early 1960s, thanks to a healthy number of births and 
immigrants. 
Among the 65+ population there is absolutely no uncertainty about the direction of 
change, as revealed by Figure 17e. Significant population ageing is guaranteed (Figure 
17f). There is almost 100% certainty that the current 2.5 million aged 65 and over will 
have expanded to more than 6 million by mid-century. The two-thirds probability for 
2051 suggests 6.7 to 8.1 million people in this age group, with the median lying at 7.4 
million. As a percentage of the total population the two-thirds probability ranges from 
23.9% and 29.1% (Figure 17f). Although this represents a substantial change from the 
2002 percentage of 12.7, it is interesting to note this is quite a bit lower than the figures 
recently forecast by Lutz and Scherbov (2003) for the European Union (of 15 members 
before the recent expansion). For the 65+ age group they give a 2050 median forecast 
of 30.8% with an 80% probability range of 26.8% to 35.5%, up from 16.3% in 2000. 
The equivalent figures for 2050 for Australia are 26.4% (median) and 23.2% to 30.3% 
(80% interval). Although it is very likely that the Elderly Dependency Ratio will be at 
least double its current value by mid-century, this will be partly offset by a decline in 
the Youth Dependency Ratio so that the overall Dependency Ratio increases by roughly 
a third (Table 2). 
 












































Figure 16:  Jump-off year and prediction interval bounds of the age-sex structure for 
selected years Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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Figure 16:  (Cont.) Jump-off year and prediction interval bounds of the age-sex 
structure for selected years 
 
Source of 2002 estimates: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
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(f) percentage 65+ 
 
Figure 17:  Estimated populations by broad age groups and prediction interval 
bounds 
Source of estimates: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Note: The slight discontinuity observed in 1971 is due to the change in the population definition from census counts of persons 
present to usually resident population estimates. Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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Table 2:  Estimated and forecast distributions of the Dependency Ratios 
  2002     2026       2051   








0.211  0.344  0.361  0.379   0.450  0.496  0.546 
Dependency 
Ratio 
0.664  0.701  0.750  0.799   0.805  0.879  0.949 
 
Source of 2002 estimates: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Note: The Youth Dependency Ratio is defined as those aged 0-19 divided by the population aged 20-64; the Elderly Dependency 




In this paper we have presented the first comprehensive set of probabilistic population 
forecasts for Australia. Their probabilistic nature enables many of the shortcomings of 
deterministic variant forecasts – such as difficulties in interpreting the likelihood of 
high and low variants, and probabilistically inconsistent high-low ranges – to be 
overcome. The key results of our 2002-based forecasts include: 
● a two thirds probability that Australia’s population will lie between 24.4 and 31.8 
million by 2051, with the median of the predictive distribution being 28.0 million 
(Figure 12); 
● considerable uncertainty over births but a median forecast which suggests an 
approximately stable number each year (Figure 13); 
● 100% certainty that the number of deaths will rise; by mid-century the annual number 
of deaths is most likely to be double the current number (Figure 14); 
● an annual level of international migration which is unlikely to fluctuate outside the  
0 – 200,000 range (Figure 9c); 
● a much older age structure, but according to the median forecast, one that we should 
not be unduly alarmed by (Figures 16 and 17, and Table 2). 
Our principal methodological contribution has been to propose a method for 
forecasting international migration which takes into account the very different trends 
and age profiles of permanent and long-term international migration. Such a distinction 
is not only useful for assumption-setting, but also permits the strong correlation 
between long-term immigration and emigration to be disentangled from permanent Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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immigration and emigration which are weakly correlated. To deal with the uncertainty 
over recent migration trends probabilistic distributions of jump-off year values were 
added. Furthermore, to better handle the populations at very advanced ages the age 
disaggregation of the cohort component model was extended beyond the normal 0-99 
and 100+ used in Australia to ages 0-119 with 120+ as the final age group.  
The last decade has been an exciting and productive time in the development of 
probabilistic population forecasting methods and applications. Indeed, the uncertainty 
of population forecasting has been the focus of a number of books and special issues of 
journals (for example, Lutz et al. 1999b, National Research Council 2000, Lutz et al. 
2004, and most recently, the International Statistical Review volume 72, numbers 1 and 
2). However, as Lutz and Goldstein (2004) have recently pointed out several challenges 
remain, both in terms of methods and in terms of the marketing of probabilistic 
forecasts to users and statistical offices. Amongst the many issues awaiting researchers’ 
attention, of particular note to us is the extension of probabilistic methods to 
subnational population forecasting. A striking feature of nearly all probabilistic 
forecasting work to date is its focus on national or supra-national areas. But the addition 
of internal migration into the forecasting equation generally renders the population 
future of subnational areas more uncertain than at the national scale. The next stage of 
our research is to extend the model described in this paper to deal with internal 
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Notes 
1.   Researchers using Australian mortality data face a number of problems. The 
earliest year for which population figures based on the usually resident definition 
are available is 1971. Prior to that only persons’ present data are available, so 
mortality rates suffer a discontinuity at this point. In addition, up to the 1960s there 
is inconsistent coverage of indigenous people both over time and in the deaths 
counts and population figures for the same year. Furthermore, there are 
inconsistencies during the two World Wars, such as all deaths during World War 2 
being dated as 1943. See Smith (2003) for an overview of these issues. Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 8 
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